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The Lower and Upper Bounds of the
Federal Open Market Committee’s
Long-Run Inflation Objective
Daniel L. Thornton
It is widely acknowledged that the Fed can control the average inflation rate over a period of time
reasonably well. Because of this and the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) long-standing
commitment to price stability, the author argues that the FOMC has an implicit long-run inflation
objective (LIO)—lower and upper bounds to the long-run inflation rate. He shows that the state-
ments made by the FOMC in 2003 clarified the lower bound of its LIO and that the average of
long-run inflation expectations responded by rising about 80 basis points. Moreover, consistent
with reducing the market’s uncertainty about the FOMC’s LIO, long-run inflation expectations
became more stable. The FOMC has recently been more specific about the upper bound of its LIO
as well. The FOMC could eliminate the remaining uncertainty by establishing an explicit, numerical
inflation objective. (JEL E50, E52, E58)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2007, 89(3), pp. 183-93.
a Federal Reserve System Governor, Bernanke
(2004) suggested that the Fed take an “incremental
move toward inflation targeting, in the form of
the announcement of a long-run inflation objec-
tive”2 (LIO), which I take to be congruent with
Bernanke’s optimal long-run inflation rate, which
he defined as “the long-run (or steady-state) infla-
tion rate that achieves the best average economic
performance over time with respect to both the
inflation and output objectives.”3 I argue that (i)
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
already has what can be reasonably characterized
as an implicit LIO and (ii) having an implicit LIO
is a consequence of the conventional wisdom that
the Fed (indeed, all central banks) can control
the long-run inflation rate. I present evidence
C
urrently there are at least 21 countries
with inflation targets.1 Inflation target-
ing is marked by a numeric inflation
objective that the central bank attempts
to achieve over a reasonably well-specified time
horizon. The numeric target is most often a range
in which inflation is permitted to vary over a
multiyear horizon. Among the industrialized
nations of the world, the central banks of the
United States and Japan stand out in not adopt-
ing a formal, numeric inflation target.
Economists and policymakers have raised a
number of objections to establishing an explicit
numeric inflation target in the United States. The
most important of these objections are discussed
in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2004) and,
hence, will not be discussed here. When he was
1 See Rasche and Williams (2005) for a list of these countries and
the details of their inflation targets.
2 Bernanke (2004, p. 165).
3 Bernanke (2004, p. 166).
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implicit LIO by showing the market’s reaction to
statements made by the FOMC in 2003.
The adoption of inflation targeting by many
of the world’s central banks is directly linked to
changing views about the central bank’s ability to
control inflation. The now conventional wisdom
that the Fed and other central banks control long-
run or steady-state inflation is the primary reason
central banks have an explicit or implicit LIO.
Hence, the paper begins with a brief review of the
evolution of thinking about the ability of central
banks to control inflation during the nearly 100
years of the Federal Reserve System.
CENTRAL BANKS AND INFLATION
Although it is now widely believed that the
FOMC has an implicit LIO, this has not always
been the case. Indeed, there has been an ebb and
flow in economists’ and policymakers’ thinking
about the ability of the central bank to control
inflation over the near 100 years of the Federal
Reserve System. The quantity theory of money
was the dominant theoretical paradigm in the
economics profession at the time of the Fed’s
founding. The quantity theory was embodied in
the gold standard, where long-run price stability
was maintained through an automatic equilibrat-
ing process known as the price-specie-flow mech-
anism. In essence, the quantity theory asserts a
strong causal link between money growth and
inflation. In fiat monetary systems, where the
currency is not backed by gold or other precious
metals, the quantity theory asserts that central
banks control inflation by controlling the rate of
growth of the money supply. Permitting the money
supply to grow more rapidly than is warranted
by labor force and productivity growth causes
inflation. Too slow money growth results in
deflation. The quantity theory hypothesizes that
inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon that central banks can control.
The early Fed was skeptical of the quantity
theory and followed what is called the real bills
doctrine. The real bills doctrine hypothesized
that reserves supplied by the Fed for “productive
purposes”—to enhance the production of goods
and services—would not be inflationary.
Economists’ thinking about what central
banks could and could not do about inflation
changed markedly following the publication of
Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money in 1936 and the subsequent
Keynesian Revolution. For various reasons, per-
haps the most important of which were concerns
that the central banks had limited ability to con-
trol the supply of money and the belief that the
demand for money was not stable, economists
and policymakers came to question central banks’
ability to control (or even substantially influence)
inflation. The conventional wisdom was that
inflation was not the consequence of an excess
supply of money, but of an excess of aggregate
demand—the demand for all goods and services—
which could occur independent of the relative
supply of money.4 Moreover, it was believed that
monetary policy had relatively little impact on
aggregate demand.5 A small effect on aggregate
demand translates into a small effect on inflation.
Consequently, it was thought that the Fed could
do relatively little to control inflation.
A high point of the belief that inflation is not
a monetary phenomenon in the United States
occurred in 1974 with the federal government’s
WIN (Whip Inflation Now) campaign. The WIN
campaign was an attempt to spur a grassroots
movement to reduce inflation through a combi-
nation of public and private measures to reduce
aggregate demand and, consequently, “demand-
pull” inflation. Fiscal policy, increased saving,
and other factors—not monetary policy—were
thought to be the keys to curing the nation’s
inflation woes.6
The monetarist counterrevolution and the
success with anti-inflation monetary policy in
Thornton
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4 See Nelson (2005a,b) and Nelson and Nikolov (2004) for a discus-
sion of how neglect of monetary factors and belief that other factors
caused inflation played a role in several of the great inflations of
the 1970s.
5 See Bernanke (1993) for an excellent and concise discussion of
some of these arguments.
6 On this note it is interesting to observe that inflation has been
trending lower despite a corresponding negative trend in the
United States saving rate.the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically
changed economists’ and policymakers’ thinking
about what central banks could do about infla-
tion.7 Despite the fact that the Fed and nearly all
other central banks now use a short-term nominal
interest rate instrument and not monetary aggre-
gates to conduct policy, it is widely acknowledged
that central banks can control inflation on average
over a period of time.8
If central banks can control the average long-
run inflation rate, it follows that they are respon-
sible for it, whether they, or the governmental
agencies to whom they report, establish a specific
numerical objective for it or not or whether, by
their actions, they effectively abdicate their
responsibility: The Fed was responsible for the
great inflation of the 1970s, even though it was
not intended. For most central banks, the realiza-
tion that they control the long-run inflation rate
has led to the adoption of formal inflation objec-
tives or inflation targets. Although it has never
adopted a specific inflation target, the Fed has
had a long-standing objective of “price stability.”
Former Chairman Greenspan repeatedly noted
that the primary role of monetary policy is to
promote sustainable economic growth over time
by fostering price stability.9 Chairman Bernanke
has reiterated the causal link between price sta-
bility and economic growth, noting that “price
stability is essential for strong and stable growth
of output and employment.”10 Given the belief
that the Fed can control the long-run inflation
rate and its stated objective of price stability, it
follows that the FOMC has an implicit LIO.11
That is, the FOMC has an implicit range of infla-
tion that is consistent with its objective of “price
stability.”
Despite his repeated assertion that sustainable
economic growth is inexorably linked to price
stability, former Chairman Greenspan opposed
adopting a specific numerical LIO on the grounds
that no price index adequately reflected price
stability and because of political concerns
(Greenspan, 2002; FOMC, 1995). In contrast,
Chairman Bernanke has been a steadfast propo-
nent of inflation targeting (e.g., Bernanke, 2002,
2003, 2004). Several other FOMC participants
also have expressed a preference for announcing
an explicit LIO recently (e.g., Poole, 2006; Lacker,
2005; Stern, 2005; and Yellen, 2006).
DOES THE MARKET BELIEVE
THE FOMC HAS A LIO?
Given the belief that the Fed is responsible
for the average long-run inflation rate and the
FOMC’s commitment to price stability, it is rea-
sonable to assume that market participants have
a perception of the FOMC’s implicit LIO. For
example, it is doubtful that anyone believes that
the FOMC would be content with long-run infla-
tion of 5 percent or with persistent and protracted
deflation. Hence, it seems safe to assert that most
market analysts believe that the FOMC’s implicit
LIO is somewhere between zero and, say, a maxi-
mum of 5 percent. Of course, some may believe
the implicit target to be narrower. Assuming that
market participants expect the FOMC to behave
consistently with its implicit LIO, the average of
these expectations provides a point estimate of
the FOMC’s implicit LIO.
The only market-based measure of inflation
expectations is the spread between Treasury
inflation-indexed securities (TIIS) and the corre-
sponding non-indexed Treasury issue. TIIS are
indexed to inflation as measured by the consumer
price index (CPI). Nominal long-term bond yields
reflect both the market’s expectation for the real
yield and expectations for inflation, whereas the
corresponding TIIS reflects only the real yield;
accordingly, the TIIS spread—the difference
between the nominal yield and the corresponding
TIIS yield—is, in principle, a measure of the
market’s expectation of inflation over the holding
period of the long-term asset. The spread is not a
pure measure of inflation expectations because
Thornton
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7 See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2005) for a detailed discus-
sion and analysis of this period in U.S. monetary policy.
8 See Bernanke (2003) for a discussion of the role of money and
monetary aggregates in the inflation process.
9 See Rasche and Thornton (2006) for more details.
10 Bernanke (2006).
11 For example, Yellen (2005) notes that “inflation…is what the Fed
can undeniably control in the long run.”the spread also may reflect risk and liquidity
premiums.12 That is, the spread is equal to
where TIISt
sp denotes the spread between nominal
and inflation-indexed Treasury securities, π e
denotes expected inflation, rp denotes the infla-
tion risk premium, and lp denotes the liquidity
premium.
The possibility of a non-zero inflation risk
premium arises from the fact that investors in
nominal debt are uncertain about the inflation
rate that will occur over the holding period of
the assets. This is due in part to uncertainty about
the FOMC’s LIO. Of course, no one expects the
FOMC to achieve its LIO exactly at each point in
time. Consequently, the inflation risk premium
might exist because of stochastic variation in
inflation around a known LIO. Either way, the
greater the uncertainty, the more investors will
have to be compensated—the larger the risk pre-
mium—assuming that investors are risk averse.13
TIIS rp lp t
sp e =+− π ,
The liquidity premium stems from the fact
that the market for TIIS is less liquid than the
market for nominal Treasury securities. Conse-
quently, TIIS investors likely receive a liquidity
premium in the form of a higher return for hold-
ing TIIS rather than more-liquid conventional
securities.
The risk and liquidity premiums have oppos-
ing effects on the spread as a measure of inflation
expectations. The existence of a risk premium
causes TIISt
sp to overestimate the market’s expec-
tation for inflation. The existence of a liquidity
premium causes TIISt
sp to underestimate inflation
expectations. Consequently, TIISt
sp only approxi-
mates CPI inflation expectations. Nevertheless,
if one is willing to assume that the sum of these
premiums is relatively stable over time, marked
changes in the TIIS spread should reflect changes
in market participants’ expectations of inflation.
Inflation-indexed securities were first issued
in January 1997. Figure 1 presents the monthly
on-the-run TIISt
sp for 10-year government securi-
ties since January 1997.14 TIISt
sp fluctuated con-
siderably during the early years of the market 12 Also, it is impossible to match the maturities of TIIS and nominal
government securities exactly. Even if the maturities were an exact
match, the two securities have different payment flows. See Sack
and Elsasser (2004) and Kwan (2005) for additional details.
13 Even if investors were risk neutral, the risk premium would not
vanish for technical reasons; see Sack (2000) and Sack and
Elsasser (2004) for details.
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10-Year TIIS Spread (monthly average)
14 On-the-run securities are the most recent issue. The on-the-run
spread reported here is obtained by subtracting the yield on the
most recently issued TIIS from the constant maturity yield on the
most recently issued nominal Treasury security that most closely
matches the maturity of the on-the-run TIIS.but settled down by early 2001. From January
2001 to June 2003, TIISt
sp averaged 1.72 percent.
In the summer of 2003 the spread began to widen,
but by January 2004 it appeared to have settled
down again. From January 2004 to March 2006,
the spread averaged 2.49 percent, 77 basis points
higher than from January 2001 to June 2003. What
is responsible for the widening of the spread?
The 2003 Experience
At the conclusion of the May 2003 meeting,
the FOMC stated in its press release that “the
probability of an unwelcome substantial fall in
inflation, though minor, exceeds that of a pickup
in inflation from its already low level.” This state-
ment was widely analyzed in the press as suggest-
ing the possibility that inflation was at the “lower
bound” of the rate acceptable to the Committee.
This interpretation was reinforced by the release
of the minutes of the May meeting on June 25
and by the FOMC’s June 2003 press release. The
minutes indicated that “substantial additional
disinflation would be unwelcome because of the
likely negative effects on economic activity and
the functioning of financial institutions and mar-
kets, and the increased difficulty of conducting
an effective monetary policy, at least potentially
in the event the economy was subjected to adverse
shocks.”15 Members agreed, however, that “there
was only a remote possibility that the process of
disinflation would cumulate to the point of a
decline for an extended period in the general
price level.”16 The June press release contained
a statement identical to the May statement, but
went on to indicate that, “On balance, the
Committee believes that the latter concern [an
unwelcome fall in inflation] is likely to predomi-
nate for the foreseeable future.”
Then-Governor Bernanke detailed his views
in a speech entitled “An Unwelcome Fall in
Inflation?” on July 23, 2003. Noting that “the
May 6 statement was more than a procedural
innovation,” Bernanke suggested that it “broke
new ground as the first occasion in which the
FOMC expressed the concern that inflation might
actually fall too low.”17 Bernanke’s suggestion
that the FOMC had a non-zero lower bound
beyond which it did not want inflation to fall
was made clear in the FOMC’s August 12 state-
ment, which read, “The Committee judges that,
on balance, the risk of inflation becoming unde-
sirably low is likely to be the predominant concern
for the foreseeable future” (emphasis added). This
statement was repeated in the September 16 and
October 28 statements.
That the 2003 experience effectively estab-
lished a lower bound for the FOMC’s LIO is also
suggested by Jeffrey Lacker, president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, who was the
Director of Research at the Richmond Fed in 2003.
Lacker (2005, p. 6) notes that
The statement issued following the May 2003
FOMC meeting asserted that a fall in inflation—
then about 1 percent—would be “unwelcome.”
This came as something of a surprise to
markets and caused a sharp reaction in long-
term rates. If an inflation target range had been
in place in 2003 with a lower bound of 1 per-
cent, the public could have inferred the Fed’s
growing concern about disinflation as the
inflation rate drifted down toward that bound...
If the May 2003 statement is interpreted as the
revelation of the lower bound of an inflation
target range, then half of an inflation target
range has been announced. And if revealing a
dislike of inflation below 1 percent was useful
in May 2003, is it not likely that revealing an
upper bound will prove useful in some future
circumstance?
The FOMC’s concern about disinflation began
to abate in the fall of 2003. At the conclusion of
the December meeting the FOMC indicated that
“the probability of an unwelcome fall in inflation
has diminished in recent months and now appears
almost equal to that of a rise in inflation.” Refer-
Thornton
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15 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, May 2003. The
last concern is reference to the so-called zero bound problem. The
zero bound problem arises because zero is the theoretical lower
bound to nominal interest rates. Because the policy instrument is
the nominal federal funds rate, the zero bound on nominal interest
rates is thought by some to set a lower bound to the FOMC’s ability
to conduct expansionary monetary policy. For a more detailed
discussion of the zero bound problem, see Bernanke (2002).
16 Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, May 2003.
17 Bernanke (2003).ence to an unwelcome fall in inflation was not
mentioned in subsequent statements.
The Effect of the 2003 Experience on
Market Participants’ Beliefs about the
FOMC’s LIO
Market participants formulate their beliefs
about the FOMC’s implicit LIO from verbatim
FOMC transcripts, minutes of FOMC meetings,
press releases made at the conclusion of each
FOMC meeting, speeches and other statements
made by the Chairman and other FOMC partici-
pants, and FOMC policy actions. It is not surpris-
ingthattherewasasharpchangeintheTIISspread
following the FOMC’s revelations concerning the
lower bound of its implicit inflation objective.
If the observed rise in the 10-year TIIS spread
were due to the market having better information
about the FOMC’s LIO, we might anticipate that
expectations would be revised at a horizon that
might reasonably be thought of as the horizon
consistent with the FOMC’s LIO. Consequently,
TIISt
sp is also calculated for the 5-year horizon.
Figure 2 presents TIISt
sp using the 5-year TIIS
beginning in October 2004 and the previous 10-
year issues that are closest to having a 5-year-
remaining term for the previous period. Because
the first 10-year TIIS was first issued in 1997, the
sample period is January 2001 through August
2006. The behavior of the 5-year TIISt
sp after the
2003 experience was similar to that of the 10-year
TIISt
sp. Specifically, the average 5-year TIISt
sp
increased by about 100 basis points, from 1.46
percent for the period January 2002 through June
2003 to 2.48 percent for the period January 2004
through April 2006.
If the marked rise in long-run inflation expec-
tations shown in Figures 1 and 2 is due to the
FOMC eliminating some uncertainty about the
lower bound of its long-run inflation objective,
we might also expect to see a reduction in the
variability of the TIIS spread. That this occurred
is verified in Figure 3, which shows the intra-
month standard deviation of the 10-year (solid
line) and 5-year (dashed line) TIIS spreads using
daily data. Despite the fact that the average level
rose, consistent with long-run inflation expecta-
tions being more precisely held, there is a marked
drop in the intra-month standard deviation in
early 2004 for both the 5-year and 10-year TIIS
spreads. For the 10-year TIISt
sp, the standard
deviation declined from 7 basis points from
January 2001 through June 2003 to 5 basis points
from January 2004 though August 2006. For the
5-year TIISt
sp, the standard deviation dropped by
a third, from 9 basis points for the period January
2002 through June 2003 to 6 basis points from
January 2004 though August 2006.
Survey Measures of Long-Run Inflation
The Blue Chip and Michigan survey also poll
their survey participants for inflation forecasts
over longer-run horizons. The Blue Chip survey
is biannual, while the Michigan survey is monthly.
The Michigan survey asks respondents what they
believe will be the average CPI inflation rate over
the next 5 to 10 years, whereas the Blue Chip fore-
casts are for 5-year and 10-year horizons. The
monthly average of the mean forecast of Michigan
survey for the period 1997-2006 are presented in
Figure 4. The qualitative implications from the
Blue Chip survey are identical, so only the
Michigan survey is presented here. Survey expec-
tations drifted down slightly from early 1997 to
early 2001; however, unlike TIISt
sp there is no
marked change in the survey forecasts of the long-
term inflation rate after mid-2003. Survey fore-
casts for long-run inflation averaged 3.3 percent
for both the period January 2001 through June
Thornton
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The Survey of Inflation Over the Next 5 to 10 Years2003 and January 2004 though July 2006. Hence,
the indication from TIISt
sp—that there was a
marked change in inflation expectations in the
wake of the FOMC being more explicit about its
LIO—is not reflected in survey expectations
measures.
The lack of response of the survey forecasts
after May 2003 is difficult to reconcile with the
marked and sustained increase in the TIIS infla-
tion expectations measure. It could be that there
was a marked increase in the liquidity premium
in the TIIS market that just happened to coincide
with the FOMC’s statements. The liquidity pre-
mium between on-the-run nominal Treasuries and
the less liquid on-the-run TIIS is not directly
observable. However, comparisons of yields of
on-the-run and off-the-run TIIS indicate that the
liquidity premium for on-the-run TIIS is small
and does not decline markedly in mid-2003.
Estimates of the liquidity premium in the nominal
Treasury market by Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright
(2006) also suggest that the liquidity premium is
rather small, about 10 basis points. Hence, it is
unlikely that the approximately 80-basis-point
widening of the spread could be attributed solely
or largely to a decline in the liquidity premium.
Alternatively, statements made at the May
and subsequent meetings could have caused the
inflation risk premium to rise. For example, some
market participants who thought that the FOMC’s
inflation target range was say 0 to 2 percent may
have become more uncertain about the FOMC’s
LIO. More generally, indications that the FOMC
had a non-zero lower bound to acceptable infla-
tion could have shaken some participants’ belief
about the FOMC’s commitment to price stability.
That the entire 80-basis-point increase can be
attributed to a larger inflation risk premium seems
unlikely, however.
Despite the fact that there is no corresponding
rise in survey measures of inflation expectations,
the fact that TIISt
sp widened following the FOMC’s
statements and leveled off when the FOMC indi-
cated that its concerns about disinflation had
waned strongly suggests that the sharp rise in
TIISt
sp reflects the market’s reevaluation of the
FOMC’s implicit LIO. One possibility is that the
FOMC’s statements effectively truncated the lower
end of the probability distribution of inflation
expectations. That is, consistent with Lacker’s
(2005) interpretation, individuals who may have
thought the Fed’s inflation objective was less than,
say, about 1 percent revised their expectation
upward. This explanation alone would not seem
to account for the 80-basis-point rise in the spread.
To see why, assume that prior to the summer of
2003 all market participants thought that the
FOMC’s LIO was 0 to 3 percent, with a mean of
1.5 percent (which is close to the average spread
from January 2001 through June 2003). If the
statements caused all market participants simply
to truncate their estimate of the lower bound of
the FOMC’s LIO at 1 percent, this would cause
the average spread to increase by only 50 basis
points, from 1.5 percent to 2 percent. It is, how-
ever, difficult to assess the impact of truncation
on the average level of inflation expectations
because the FOMC was vague about the lower
bound for inflation. Some market participants
may have thought that the effective lower bound
was now higher than the 1 percent rate suggested
by Lacker. Nevertheless, if the nearly 80-basis-
point rise in the spread is entirely due to a rise
in inflation expectations among market partici-
pants, it would seem that the FOMC’s statements
must have caused some market participants to
raise their estimate of the upper bound of the
implicit LIO as well. For example, participants
who previously thought the FOMC’s target range
was 0 to 2 percent could have raised the estimated
range to 1 to 3 percent.
The Upper Bound of the FOMC’s LIO
Statements made in 2003 suggest that the
FOMC has a lower bound of acceptable long-run
inflation in the neighborhood of 1 percent. Given
its commitment to price stability, there can be no
doubt that the FOMC has an upper bound as well.
However, as Bernanke (2004) has noted, the pub-
licly expressed preferences for the LIO by various
members of the FOMC range “from less than 1
percent to 2.5 percent or more.”18 With the recent
Thornton
190 MAY/JUNE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
18 Bernanke (2004, p. 165).rise in inflation, the FOMC has provided more
information about the upper bound of its implicit
LIO. The minutes of the August 9, 2005, FOMC
meeting indicate that
While recent monthly readings indicated that
core inflation had been subdued, a number of
participants noted that underlying core infla-
tion appeared to be running at a pace around
the upper end of the range they viewed as con-
sistent with price stability—an assessment that
was reinforced by the recent upward revisions
to historical data on core PCE inflation. Partici-
pants commented that an increase in inflation
from recent rates could have especially adverse
effects on longer-run economic performance.
(emphasis added)
A similar statement appeared in the minutes
of the March 27-28, 2006, FOMC meeting, where
Some participants held that core inflation
and inflation expectations were already toward
the upper end of the range that they viewed
as consistent with price stability, making them
particularly vigilant about upside risks to infla-
tion, especially given how costly it might be
to bring inflation expectations back down if
they were to rise. (emphasis added)
A similar statement appeared in the minutes
of the May 10, 2006, meeting.
The minutes of June 28-29, 2006, meeting are
more specific in that they indicate that inflation
may have already reached the Committee’s
upper bound. The minutes note that
All participants found the elevated readings on
core inflation of recent months to be of concern
and, if sustained, inconsistent with the main-
tenance of price stability. (emphasis added)
During the three months prior to this meeting,
annual core CPI inflation averaged about 3.75
percent, while core PCE inflation averaged about
3.1 percent. The lack of specificity about the core
measure to which the FOMC was referring creates
uncertainty about the upper bound of the FOMC’s
inflation objective. Nevertheless, if these numbers
reflect “core inflation of recent months,” the
upper bound of the FOMC’s LIO is somewhere
in the neighborhood of 3.1 to 3.75 percent.
If one assumes that Lacker’s suggestion that
the 2003 experience established the lower bound
of the FOMC’s implicit LIO at 1 percent, one can
conjecture that the FOMC’s implied LIO is, say, 1
to 3.5 percent. The midpoint of this range, 2.25
percent, is very close to Chairman Bernanke’s
(2004, p. 166) suggestion that “something in the
vicinity of 2 percent is the optimal long-run
average inflation rate for a variety of assumptions
about the costs of inflation, the structure of the
economy, the distribution of shocks, etc.”
Bernanke noted, however, that many details
would have to be decided before such a number
could be embraced by the FOMC and suggested
that additional research would be worthwhile
before the FOMC could decide on the optimal
long-run inflation rate. The estimate of 2.25 per-
cent is below the TIIS spread of 2.5 percent, but
the difference can easily be accounted for by a
non-zero inflation risk premium.
CONCLUSIONS
Because the Fed can control the average long-
run inflation rate and because of the FOMC’s
long-standing commitment to price stability, it
is reasonable to assume that the FOMC has an
implicit LIO. The 2003 experience clarified the
lower bound of the FOMC’s LIO. The minutes of
June 2006 have clarified the FOMC’s upper
bound. That this recent guidance does not appear
to have affected the TIIS spread significantly sug-
gests that the information merely reinforced the
market’s belief in the upper bound of the FOMC’s
LIO. The FOMC could alleviate the remaining
uncertainty by following Bernanke’s (2002) sug-
gestion and formally announcing a LIO. Until it
does, the market will have to rely on FOMC state-
ments, actions, and other information to pin it
down more tightly.
REFERENCES
Bernanke, Ben S. “Credit in the Macroeconomy.”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly
Review, Spring 1993, 18(1), pp. 50-70.
Thornton
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 2007 191Bernanke, Ben S. “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t
Happen Here.” Remarks before the National
Economists Club, Washington, DC, November 21,
2002.
Bernanke, Ben S. “An Unwelcome Fall in Inflation?”
Remarks before the Economics Roundtable,
University of California at San Diego, La Jolla,
California, July 23, 2003.
Bernanke, Ben S. “Panel Discussion: Inflation
Targeting.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, July/August 2004, 86(4), pp. 165-68.
Bernanke, Ben S. Semiannual Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress, February 15, 2006.
Federal Open Market Committee. Transcript of the
January 31–February 1, 1995, meeting. Washington,
DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Inflation
Targeting: Prospects and Problems. Proceedings of
the Twenty-Eighth Annual Economic Policy
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
July/August 2004, 86(4), pp. 3-184.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Reflections on
Monetary Policy 25 Years After October 1979.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review,
March/April 2005, 87(2), Part 2, pp. 137-358.
Greenspan, Alan. “Chairman’s Remarks.” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August
2002, 84(4), pp. 5-6.
Gurkaynak, Refet S.; Brian, Sack and Wright,
Jonathan H. “The U.S. Treasury Yield Curve: 1961
to the Present.” Finance and Economic Discussion
Series 2006-28, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 2006.
Kwan, Simon. “Inflation Expectations: How the
Market Speaks.” Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Economic Letter, October 3, 2005, No.
2005-25, pp. 1-3.
Lacker, Jeffery M. “Inflation Targeting and the
Conduct of Monetary Policy.” Speech at the
University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia,
March 1, 2005.
Nelson, Edward. “Monetary Policy Neglect and the
Great Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand.” International Journal of Central Banking,
June 2005a, 1(1), pp. 133-79.
Nelson, Edward. “The Great Inflation of the
Seventies: What Really Happened?” Advances in
Macroeconomics, July 2005b, 5(1), Article 3.
Nelson, Edward and Nikolov, Kalin. “Monetary
Policy and Stagflation in the UK.” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, June 2004, 36(3), pp.
293-318.
Poole, William. “Inflation Targeting.” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, May/June 2006,
88(3), pp. 155-64.
Rasche, Robert H. and Thornton, Daniel L.
“Greenspan’s Unconventional View of the Long-
Run Inflation/Output Trade-Off.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Monetary Trends, January 2006.
Rasche, Robert H. and Williams, Marcela M. “The
Effectiveness of Stabilization Policy.” Bank of
Korea International Conference 2005, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper, 2005-
048B, 2005.
Sack, Brian. “Deriving Inflation Expectations from
Nominal and Inflation-Indexed Treasury Yields.”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Finance and Economics Discussion Series,
Working Paper 2000-33, 2000.
Sack, Brian and Elsasser, Robert. “Treasury Inflation-
Indexed Debt: A Review of the U.S. Experience.”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic
Policy Review, May 2004, 10(1), pp. 47-63.
Stern, Gary H. “Top of the Ninth: Formalizing the
Success of Past Policy.” Federal Reserve Bank of




192 MAY/JUNE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWYellen, Janet L. “Challenges for Policymaking in a
Changing Global Economy.” Speech presented to
the Bank of Korea’s International Conference 2005,
Seoul, Korea, May 27, 2005.
Yellen, Janet L. “Enhancing Fed Credibility.” Speech
presented at the Annual Washington Policy
Conference of the National Association of Business
Economists, Washington, DC, March 13, 2006.
Thornton
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW MAY/JUNE 2007 193194 MAY/JUNE 2007 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW